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This paper investigates the change in private-sector and Federal Reserve forecasts 
before and after the Great Moderation.  We view the Great Moderation as a natural 
experiment.  Using forecasts produced by the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the 
Federal Reserve (Greenbook forecasts) we investigate four questions: 1) How large was 
the decline in forecast errors? 2)  Did forecast accuracy improve relative to the decline in 
volatility of growth and inflation? 3) Did forecasters respond to the Great Moderation?    
4)  What are the potential benefits to monetary policymakers of smaller forecast errors?  
We find that the absolute median error as well as the cross-sectional volatility of forecast 
errors decreased significantly.  Forecasters appeared to have narrowed the dispersion of 
their forecasts in response to the Great Moderation.  Forecast accuracy did not improve 
relative to the reduction in the volatility of the economy.   To the extent that the Fed is 
forward-looking when it sets its federal funds rate target, improvements in forecast 
accuracy imply substantial improvements in the Fed’s ability to reach its optimum federal 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the mid-1980s the U.S. economy has experienced a Great Moderation.  
Both GDP growth and inflation volatility have declined significantly.  Figures 1 and 2 
show real GDP growth and inflation over the past 60 years.  Margaret M. McConnell and 
Gabriel Perez-Quiros (2000) found that the most likely break point for GDP volatility is 
the first quarter of 1984.  James A. Kahn, McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2002) find a 
break in inflation volatility at about that same time although the relative smoothness of 
inflation post-1984 is not unprecedented (inflation was relatively smooth in the 1950s as 
well).   The standard deviation of annualized GDP growth from 1947 through 1983 was 
nearly 5%.  From 1984 through 2008 the standard deviation of annualized real GDP 
growth was 2.2%.  Similarly, the standard deviation of inflation (annualized growth of 
the GDP deflator) from 1947 through 1983 was 3.3%. From 1984 through 2008 the 
standard deviation of inflation has been 1.05%.  
The decline in GDP and inflation volatility provides a natural experiment to 
investigate how forecasts of growth and inflation respond to changes in the underlying 
distributions of those variables.  We address the following questions.  1) How large was 
the decline in forecast errors? 2)  Did forecast accuracy improve relative to the decline in 
volatility of growth and inflation? 3) Did forecasters respond to the Great Moderation?  
4)  What are the potential benefits to monetary policymakers of smaller forecast errors?  
We investigate these questions by looking at changes in forecast accuracy for the Survey 
of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Federal Reserve (FR)
1.   
                                                 
1. The forecasts we use in this study are the Greenbook forecasts which are prepared by the staff of the Board of Governors and are 
therefore sometimes referred to as the staff forecasts to differentiate them from the forecasts presented by the members of the FOMC.  
See Gavin and Mandal (2001) for a comparison of private sector and FOMC forecasts.   4
We find that the absolute value of forecast errors for both the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters and the Federal Reserve fell significantly after the Great 
Moderation.  At most forecast horizons the decline was 50% or more.  We also find that 
the dispersion of forecasts in the Survey of Professional Forecasters dropped significantly 
after the Great Moderation.  We argue that the drop in dispersion indicates that 
forecasters did in fact respond to the Great Moderation by changing their forecasts.   The 
decline in the dispersion of forecasts was roughly coincident with the onset of the Great 
Moderation.  Finally, we find that the improvement in forecasting implies that the Fed is 
likely to be 3 percentage points closer to its perfect-foresight federal funds target based 
on the Taylor rule. 
In section 2 we review the literature on the Great Moderation.  Section 3 describes 
the data.  Section 4 presents evidence on the improvement in forecast performance after 
the Great Moderation.  Section 5 looks at the change in forecast performance relative to 
the reduction in the volatility of GDP growth and inflation.  Section 6 presents a model of 
forecaster behavior, which shows that in order to detect a change in forecaster behavior, 
one must look at the change in the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts.   Section 7 
presents the results from the endogenous break point tests.  Section 8 discusses the 
possible benefits of smaller forecast errors for monetary policy and section 9 concludes. 
  
2.  Literature Investigating the Sources of the Great Moderation 
The Great Moderation in both growth and inflation are clearly evident from 
Figures 1 and 2.  But the causes of the Great Moderation are still debated.  In general, 
researchers classify causes of the Great Moderation into three categories:  good luck,   5
improved policy and structural change.  By “good luck” researchers mean smaller shocks 
to the economy.  Improved policy generally refers to improved monetary policy.  
Structural change means that the propagation mechanism which translates shocks into 
business cycle fluctuations has changed in a way that leads to smaller fluctuations. 
McConnell and Perez-Quiros (MPQ) and more recently Davis and Kahn (2008) 
attribute the decline in GDP volatility to structural change.  They show that the decline in 
GDP volatility was due mainly to a decline in the volatility of durable goods output, 
which resulted from improved inventory management.  Kim, Nelson and Piger (2003) 
find that the Great Moderation was more broadly based than durable goods output 
suggesting that policy could have played an important role in the Great Moderation. 
Stock and Watson (2002) investigate several sources of the Great Moderation.  They find 
that improved policy accounted for 20-30% of the moderation in GDP.  Identifiable good 
luck accounts for another 20-30% of the moderation and unidentifiable good luck 
accounts for the rest (40-60%).   
  Another issue discussed in the literature is whether the moderation was due to a 
change in the propagation mechanism or the size of shocks feeding into an unchanging 
propagation mechanism.  Recent work by Gali and Gambetti (2009) and Ramey and Vine 
(2006) suggests that the propagation mechanism did change.  In contrast, Stock and 
Watson (2002), Justiniano and Pimiceri (2006) and Arias et al. (2006) find that the 
propagation mechanism has remained stable but the shocks got smaller starting in the 
early to mid 1980s.  
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3.  Data 
We use three sources of data to measure the decline in forecast errors that 
occurred with the onset of the Great Moderation.  The first source is the Survey of 
Professional Forecasters (SPF)
2, the second source is the Federal Reserve’s Greenbook 
forecasts which are released with a 5-year lag and the third is a set of forecasts produced 
by a sequence of ARMA models which serve as our benchmark forecasts.  The sample of 
forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters covers the period 1968.4 through 
2008.4.  The sample of forecasts from the Greenbooks covers the sample 1965.11 
through 2002.12.  The Greenbook forecasts are prepared for each FOMC meeting (12 
meetings per year prior to the early 1980s and 8 meetings per year since that time).  For 
the forecast error comparisons we use the common sample period of 1968.11 through 
2002.12.    
Our variables of interest are quarterly real output growth and quarterly inflation.   
We investigate the change in forecast accuracy for horizons 1 through 4 quarters ahead.  
Although the unit of analysis is the same in all three datasets, that is, quarterly forecasts, 
the frequency at which we observe those forecasts does differ across the three datasets.  
The SPF forecasts are quarterly, the ARMA forecasts are monthly and the Greenbook 
forecasts are produced only during months in which there are FOMC meetings.  
Our forecast errors are computed using the real-time measures of real output 
growth and inflation (see Croushore and Stark, 2001).  Our real-time measures are the 
first final revisions published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the end of the third 
                                                 
2 The SPF was previously called the ASA-NBER survey of forecasters from 1968 to 1990.  The Federal 
Reserve Bank of Philadelphia took over the survey in 1990.  See Croushore and Stark (2001) for a 
complete description of the SPF. 
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month following the end of each quarter
3.  We define the forecast errors as the difference 
between the real time actual observation and the forecast of that observation.   Real 
output growth is measured as the annualized growth of real GNP before 1992 and real 
GDP afterwards.  Inflation is the annualized growth of the GNP deflator prior to 1992, 
the GDP deflator between 1992 and 1996 and the GDP chain-weighted price index after 
1996.  These changes in measures of real growth and inflation match the changes in the 
variables that the Federal Reserve and SPF were forecasting.  
  
4.  Forecast Errors Before and After the Great Moderation 
 
  We begin by looking at the absolute value of the median forecast error from the 
SPF before and after the onset of the Great Moderation.  According to MPQ, the Great 
Moderation began in the first quarter of 1984.  We measure the average of the median 
error before and after the Great Moderation by estimating the following regression: 
|error t |=α1D1t +α2D2t +εt    (1) 
where, 
  D1t =1  for t ≤   1983:4  
0 for t > 1983:4 
D2t = 0  for t ≤   1983:4  
1 for t > 1983:4 
  Table 1 shows the results for the absolute value of the median SPF errors for 
forecast horizons 1-4.  We obtained similar results for the absolute value of the mean but 
chose to focus on the median because the Jarque-Bera test strongly rejected normality in 
                                                 
3.  These real-time measures are also referred to as the 90-day measures.   8
the cross-sectional distribution of the SPF data.  The results in Table 1 show that the 
absolute value of the median forecast error dropped by half in most cases (by more than 
half in some cases) and the decrease was statistically significant in all cases.   The 
reduction in forecast errors is about the same across all 4 horizons.   
  Table 2 shows the results for the absolute value of the forecast error for horizons 
1 to 4 for the Federal Reserve Greenbook forecasts.  The values for the average forecast 
errors of the Fed are similar to the values for the average (and median) forecast errors for 
the SPF.  In addition, like the SPF, the Fed’s forecast errors dropped significantly with 
the onset of the Great Moderation, in many cases by half or more.  And, like the SPF, the 
Fed’s forecast performance, by this measure, improved almost equally at all forecast 
horizons. 
  Our benchmark forecast model is a recursively estimated ARMA model.  We 
identified and estimated a separate ARMA model for each real-time monthly data set 
starting in 1968.11 and continuing through 2002.12.   The specification for each model is 
based on the minimum SIC statistic.  Table 3 shows the results for the absolute value of 
the ARMA forecast errors.  The ARMA errors are uniformly larger than both the Fed 
errors and the SPF’s errors before the onset of the Great Moderation.  The percentage 
decline in the size of the errors ranges from 55% to 60%, only slight larger than the 
percentage declines in the SPF and Fed errors.  A particularly large drop occurred at the 
1-quarter horizon for real output growth.  Prior to 1983 the ARMA forecast error for 1-
quarter head growth was almost 4% and after 1984.1 that error dropped 58% which is 12 
percentage points larger than the drop in SPF errors and 14 percentage points larger than 
the drop in Fed errors.  After the Great Moderation the sizes of the ARMA forecast errors   9
are nearly identical to the SPF and Fed errors.  Figure 3 summarizes the information 
contained in Tables 1 through 3. 
  An advantage of the SPF dataset is that it can provide information on changes in 
the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts over time.  Table 4 shows the results of 
estimating equation (1) by replacing the absolute error as the dependent variable with a 
measure of the cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts at each point in time.  We chose to 
measure the cross-sectional dispersion by taking the difference between the upper third 
quartile and lower first quartile of the forecast errors in each quarter.  Again, we chose 
this measure instead of the standard deviation of forecasts errors because the forecast 
errors are not normally distributed.   The diagram below illustrates our calculation for the 
1-quarter ahead forecasts of inflation for 1973:4.  We first ordered the forecasts from 
high to low and divided the forecasts into quartiles.  We then subtracted the forecast at 
the border between the 3
rd and 4
th quartile from the forecast at the border between the 1
st 
and 2nd quartile to compute the dispersion of forecasts for that quarter.  For 1973:4, the 
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The results in Table 4 indicate that the dispersion of forecast errors for growth decreased 
significantly at all forecast horizons with the onset of the Great Moderation.  The 
dispersion of inflation forecasts dropped at horizons 1 and 4, but the decline at horizon 2 
is not significant and the decline at horizon 3 is only marginally significant.  In 
percentage terms, the drop in the dispersion of growth forecasts across forecast horizons 
are nearly identical (45-50%).   For inflation, the decline in dispersion is mixed:  the 1 
and 4 quarter horizon dispersion dropped by 23%. The dispersion of inflation forecast 
errors declined by 15% at the 2-quarter ahead horizon and 16% at the 3-quarter ahead 
horizon.  Figures 5 and 6 summarize the results contained in Table 4. 
 
5.  Has Forecast Performance Improved Relative to the Change in Forecastability? 
  Although professional and Fed forecasts declined in absolute value and volatility 
after the Great Moderation, the economy was, in some sense, easier to forecast because 
both growth and inflation were less volatile.   An interesting question, therefore, is 
whether forecast errors fell relative to the change in the degree of difficulty, or 
forecastability of the economy.    
With respect to inflation, Atkeson and Ohanian (2001) and Stock and Watson 
(2007) found that most of the decline in volatility after 1984 was due to a drop in the 
volatility of the predictable part of inflation.  Thus, overall forecast errors should have 
declined after 1984, but forecast errors normalized for the reduction in volatility should 
not have declined and may have in fact increased.      11
  Campbell (2007) decomposes the volatility of real output growth into a 
predictable part and an unpredictable part.   He uses the SPF to measure the predictable 
part arguing that the SPF represents a reasonable benchmark for the “forecastability” of 
the economy.   Previous researchers had used fixed-weight autoregressive time series 
models to produce benchmark forecasts.    The SPF has two advantages over those 
models:  SPF forecasts are based on real-time data and they are much more data-rich 
compared to univariate models.   
However, using the SPF as a benchmark for the forecastability of the economy 
ignores the microeconomics of forecasting.  The Great Moderation reduced the cost of 
producing a given-sized forecast error.  In the face of this reduction in cost, forecasters 
face an income and a substitution effect, which may or may not result in them “choosing” 
to reduce their overall forecast error.  By equating the size of the SPF error with the 
change in forecastability, Campbell implicitly assumed that there is no substitution effect.  
  Because of these microeconomic considerations, we choose to measure the 
forecastability of the economy using our benchmark ARMA forecasts. Our ARMA 
models have the advantage that they are based on statistical criterion (lowest SIC) and 
therefore not subject to the income and substitution effects described above
4.  The 
forecast error for the ARMA benchmark forecast error for horizon h at time t is 
denoted ARMA errort
h 
                                                 
4.  We examined ARMA models from ARMA(0,0) to ARMA (8,8) when selecting a specification for each time period.   12
  To investigate whether forecast errors fell relative to the reduction in the volatility 
of growth and inflation we constructed an h-step ahead normalized forecast error 










     (2) 
where 





∑  is a centered 4-month moving average of the h-step ahead ARMA 
forecast error.  The numerator of equation (2) contains the h-step ahead forecast error for 
either the SPF or the Greenbook.  Thus, the normalized error controls for the degree of 
difficulty in forecasting (the forecastability) as defined by the ARMA model. 
              Tables 5 and 6 show the results from estimating equation (1) replacing the 
dependent variable with the normalized error, NEt for the SPF and the Fed respectively.  
The results of both tables suggest that forecasting did not improve relative to the 
reduction in the volatility of the economy.  In most cases the normalized error, NEt 
increased slightly (but not significantly).  In those few cases where NEt fell, the reduction 
was insignificant as well.  Figures 7 and 8 summarize the results in Tables 5 and 6. 
 
 
6.  A Model of Forecaster Behavior   
The drop in the volatility of the economy after the Great Moderation would result 
in smaller errors, even if forecasters continued to use the same model.  Therefore, it is not 
possible to detect a change in forecaster behavior by looking at the absolute median error 
of the SPF or the absolute error of the Fed.  To illustrate this point, suppose the economy 
follows a simple MA(1) process: 
   yt = βεt−1 + εt                             εt ~WN(0,σ
2)   (3)   13
where  yt  is real output growth (or inflation).   Suppose pre-Great Moderation, 
 β = β
pre and post-Great Moderation, β = β
post.   Further, assume the variance of the 
shock is    σ
2,prebefore the Great Moderation and σ
2,post afterward. 
  If forecasters know the true model of the economy leading up to the Great 
Moderation (they know  β
pre ) and they continue to use that model immediately after the 
Great Moderation.  Their 1-step ahead forecast error will therefore be: 
   yt+1 − ö yt+1 = (β
pre − β
post)εt + εt+1 
  If the propagation mechanism remains unchanged (β
pre = β
post)as in Stock and 
Watson (2002), Justiniano and Pimiceri (2006) and Arias et al. (2006), then it is clear that 
the absolute size of the error will fall even if forecasters do not change their model since 
the absolute size of    εt+1 declined after the Great Moderation.   Therefore, if we assume 
that the Great Moderation was due to only a decline in the size of the shock, then we are 
unable to detect a change in forecaster behavior by looking at the absolute size of the 
error.  
So how can we then detect a change in forecaster behavior in response to the 
Great Moderation?  Lamont (2002) proposes a model based on Scharfstein and Stein 
(1990) that explains why forecasts will differ among forecasters at any point in time.  By 
modifying the Lamont model we are able to explain how data on the cross-sectional 
distribution of forecast errors can be used to detect a change in forecaster behavior in 
response to the Great Moderation.   
Lamont (2002) suggests that a forecaster’s wage is a function of the absolute 
value of the forecast error and the distance between his individual forecast and the   14
consensus forecast.  This second argument is meant to capture the benefit that a 
forecaster will receive by distinguishing his or her forecast from the consensus forecast.  
In Lamont’s model: 
   Wt
i = f (|εt |,| ö yi − ö yc |)        (6) 
where    f1' ≤ 0and where    | ö yc |is the consensus forecast (which could be either the mean or 
median forecast).  If     f2' > 0, then forecasters will “scatter” meaning that there will be a 
distribution of forecasts at each point in time.   
  The Lamont model explains why forecasts might differ at each point in time.  We 
extend that model to provide a possible explanation for why forecasters in our sample 
may have responded to a decrease in the volatility of the economy as measured by  σ
2.  
We hypothesize that an individual forecaster’s wage is increasing in the distance from the 
consensus up to a point.  Beyond that point, an individual forecaster’s wage is decreasing 
in the distance from the consensus.  If  f2' > 0throughout, a forecaster would maximize 
his wage by publishing a forecast of infinity.  Obviously there is some point at which a 
forecast goes from being “different” to being “absurd.”  We call this point “da” and 
hypothesize that    da = g(σ
2), g' > 0.  For a constant forecast error, the relationship 
between an individual forecaster’s wage and the distance of his forecast from the 
consensus is increasing to a point (da) and then decreasing after that point as depicted 
below.   15
 
With the onset of the Great Moderation, the relationship between  Wt
i and 
   | ö yi − ö yc |shifted to the left and therefore the boundary between “different” and “absurd” 
shifted left as well:     da2 = g(σ
2,post) < da1 = g(σ
2,pre)  Lamont’s theory, along with the 
reasonable assumption that the da depends on σ
2, provides an explanation for why the 
cross-sectional distribution of forecasts shrank following the onset of the Great 
Moderation.   
The results reported in Table 4 and Figures 5 and 6 show the drop in the 
dispersion of forecast errors after the onset of the Great Moderation.  These results are 
consistent with the model presented in this section (especially the growth forecast errors) 







t W  
2 da   da1  | ö yi − ö yc |   16
7.  Endogenous Break Point Tests   
  The results presented in Tables 1-6 assume that the Great Moderation started in 
the first quarter of 1984.  However, it is certainly possible that response of forecasters to 
the break in volatility does not correspond to the actual break in volatility.  In this section 
we present results from an endogenous break point test to determine the timing of 
forecasters’ response to the Great Moderation.   
The analysis in Section 6 suggests that in order to detect a change in forecaster 
behavior we must look at the timing of the decrease in the cross-sectional dispersion of 
forecast errors.  Table 7 reports the results of searching endogenously for the break point 
in the interquartile dispersion series.  We estimated equation (1) with the interquartile 
dispersion as the dependent variable over each sample split beginning in 1975:3 (to allow 
enough degrees of freedom) and ending with 2002:12.  Table 7 reports the date at which 
the split most likely occurred based on the likelihood ratio statistic
5.   
   The decline in the dispersion of output growth forecasting errors appears to have 
occurred in the early 1980s (except for the 2-quarter-ahead horizon for real output 
growth).  Similarly, the dispersion of inflation forecast errors decline in the early-to-mid- 
1980s.  Thus, it appears that forecasters adjusted their forecasts almost 
contemporaneously with the Great Moderation.   These results are consistent with the 
rational expectations hypothesis. 
                                                 
5 The p-values are computed using Hansen’s (2000) “fixed regressor bootstrap” 
procedure. 
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8.  The Benefits for Monetary Policy Making 
There are several ways in which a reduction in the size of forecast errors benefits 
the economy as a whole.  Improved inventory management and improved cost 
projections are two examples.  In the public sector, the reduction in forecast errors could 
translate into improved policymaking.  In this section, we look specifically at the benefits 
of the reduction in the size of forecast errors in the context of monetary policy.  
Following Sinclair et al. (2009), we measure the improvement in monetary policy by 
computing the policy forecast error.  The policy forecast error is the difference between 
the federal funds interest rate target that the Fed would set under perfect foresight and the 
federal funds interest rate target it would set if it based its target on a forward-looking 
Taylor rule.  Thus, this calculation begins with the assumption that the Fed (implicitly) 





e − y*)   (7) 
 where i
T,e is the target federal fund rate based on expected inflation and output growth, 
r* is the target real interest rate, π* is the target inflation rate and y* is the (log of) 
potential output.  Monetary policy is forward-looking: πt+h
e and yt+h
e are the h-step ahead 
expectations or forecasts of inflation and output growth
6.  Orphanides (2001) argues that 
the relevant horizon for the Fed is 4 quarters, thus we set h =4 for our analysis.   






A − y*),    (8) 
                                                 
6. See Sinclair et al. (2009) for why it is appropriate to use output growth rather than the (log of) real output.   18
where πt+4
A and yt+4
A are the actual (real time) values of inflation and output growth.  As 
long as the Fed’s forecasts are unbiased, it
T = it
T,eon average.  Period by period, however, 
it
T will differ from it
T,e because of errors in forecasting.  Sinclair et al. call this the policy 





e () + 0.5 yt+4
A − yt+4
e ( )   (9) 
  Although the policy forecast error will be zero on average, it is informative to 
look at the absolute value of this error to get a sense of how far away from the optimal 
federal funds rate the Fed would be if it followed the Taylor rule meeting by meeting. 
Using the coefficients from Table 2 we can compute the average absolute PFE, pre and 
post 1984:1: 
|PFEt|=  1.5(1.88) + .5(3.08) = 4.36 prior to 1984:1 
|PFEt|=  1.5(0.75) + .5(1.68) = 1.40 after to 1984:1 
The difference, 2.96, represents the reduction in the absolute value of the PFE as a result 
of the Great Moderation. Thus, one direct measurable benefit of the reduction in forecast 
errors associated with Great Moderation is that the Fed, on average, is nearly three 
percentage points closer to the optimal federal funds rate.   
  There is considerable evidence that the federal funds rate is more persistent than 
described by the standard Taylor rule (equation (7)).  Some researchers (Clarida, Gali, 
Gertler (2000)) have argued that the source of persistence is the Fed smoothing interest 
rates by gradually moving to the optimal interest rate rather than setting the target federal 
funds rate equal to the (expected) optimal federal funds rate period by period.  The reason 
that the Fed might move gradually to the optimal rate is because of both forecast 
uncertainty and data uncertainty.  If the Fed realizes that it has made an error forecasting   19
growth or inflation, or if data are revised, it is easier to undo or reverse the federal funds 
rate change if it has only partly adjusted toward the (now erroneous) optimum.  In other 
words, the absolute value of the PFE’s calculated above likely overstates the actual errors 
that the Fed experienced because the Fed’s approach of gradually moving to the optimum 
means that they probably never fully got to the optimum before they realize that they 
mis-forecasted growth or inflation.  But to the extent that the Fed is smoothing its interest 
rate changes to mitigate the effects of forecast uncertainty, the reduction in forecast 
uncertainty associated with the Great Moderation implies that the Fed can move toward 
the perfect-foresight federal funds target rate more quickly than they could prior to the 
mid-1980s.   
 
9.  Summary and Conclusion 
  U.S. growth and inflation volatility dropped significantly in the mid-1980s.  The 
empirical evidence presented in this paper shows that forecast errors dropped in absolute 
size, but forecast errors normalized for the size of economic fluctuation remained roughly 
unchanged.  The cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts fell in conjunction with the Great 
Moderation, which is consistent with a change in forecaster behavior in response to the 
Great Moderation.  By our calculation, the reduction in forecast errors makes it easier for 
the Fed to conduct monetary policy by either allowing the Fed to achieve a target federal 
funds rate that is closer to the perfect-foresight target rate or by reducing the Fed’s need 
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Figure 3 
Average Absolute Forecast Errors--GDP
Growth 
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Table 1 
Pre and Post 1984:1 Absolute Median Forecast Errors 
























Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
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Table 2 
Pre and Post 1984:1 Absolute Forecast Errors 




























































Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
** indicates significant at the 0.01 level 
* indicates significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 3 




























































Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
** indicates significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table 4 
Pre and Post 1984:1 Interquartile Dispersion  



























































Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
** indicates significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table 5 
Pre and Post 1984:1 Absolute Normalized Forecast Errors  



























































Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
** indicates significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table 6 
Pre and Post 1984:1 Absolute Normalized Forecast Errors  



























































Newey-West standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficient estimates 
** indicates significant at the 0.01 level   30
Table 7 
Endogenous Breakpoint Test  
Interquartile Dispersion 










        yt+1 1983.2 .000 
yt+2 1990.11 .000 
yt+3 1983.8 .000 
yt+4 1981.11 .000 
πt+1  1982.8 .000 
πt+2  1982.8 .000 
πt+3  1985.11 .000 
πt+4  1986.5 .000 
Notes:  the p-values were computed by the “fixed-regressor bootstrap method” described 
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